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HOW WILL MORSE V. FREDERICK BE APPLIED? 
by 
Erwin Chemerinsky* 
In 2007, the Supreme Court decided Morse v. Frederick, a 5-4 decision in 
which Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, decided that a student 
could be punished for displaying a banner with the words “BONG HiTS 4 
JESUS” on a public sidewalk. In this Essay, the author explores the 
implications of this decision, focusing on the important question of how it 
will be understood and applied by school officials, school boards, and lower 
court judges. The author suggests that the opinion was misguided and—
from a First Amendment perspective—highly undesirable. 
The author argues that the decision cannot be justified under existing First 
Amendment principles, and cautions that it could be seen as authorizing 
punishment of students for speech that is deemed distasteful or offensive, 
even just juvenile. However, the concurring opinion by Justice Alito suggests 
that the decision is exceedingly narrow and based on a very unusual factual 
context. The author notes that if Justice Alito’s opinion is seen as defining 
the scope of the holding, the case establishes only the power of schools to 
punish speech encouraging illegal drug use rather than giving school 
officials great discretion to punish student speech.  
Despite the fact that Morse v. Frederick is consistent with decisions from 
the Supreme Court and lower federal courts over the last two decades, the 
author’s hope is that Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion will be read 
through the prism of Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, thereby having little 
effect on the already very limited First Amendment rights of students.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The most important question about Morse v. Frederick is how it will be 
understood and applied by school officials, school boards, and lower 
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court judges.1 Will this decision be seen as authorizing punishment of 
students for speech that is deemed distasteful or offensive or even just 
juvenile?2 Or will it be regarded as a narrow decision about a very 
unusual factual context?  Justice Alito’s concurring opinion offers hope 
that it will have little effect. He wrote separately, joined by Justice 
Kennedy, to suggest that it is an exceedingly narrow decision. Justice 
Alito wrote: 
I join the opinion of the Court on the understanding that (a) it 
goes no further than to hold that a public school may restrict 
speech that a reasonable observer would interpret as advocating 
illegal drug use and (b) it provides no support for any restriction of 
speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any 
political or social issue, including speech on issues such as ‘the 
wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for 
medicinal use.’3 
My hope is that lower courts will read Chief Justice Roberts’s 
majority opinion through the prism of Justice Alito’s concurring opinion. 
After all, it was a 5-4 decision and Justices Alito and Kennedy were 
obviously integral to that result. Yet, I worry that there will be the 
tremendous temptation to read the opinion broadly as giving school 
officials great discretion to punish student speech. I want to suggest in 
this Essay that the opinion was misguided because the only way that it 
makes doctrinal sense is if it is read as being about deference to school 
officials, but from a First Amendment perspective this is highly 
undesirable. 
Thus, Part II of this Essay argues that the decision cannot be justified 
under existing First Amendment principles, other than the need for 
deference to school officials. In Part III, I argue why this is undesirable 
and thus why school officials and lower courts should adopt Justice 
Alito’s interpretation of the opinion. 
II. WHAT WAS WRONG WITH CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’S 
APPROACH? 
In many ways, the Court’s majority opinion was at odds with long-
standing First Amendment precepts. First, the Court upheld a viewpoint-
based restriction in a public forum. I cannot think of any other case that 
ever has done this. Public sidewalks long have been regarded as the 
quintessential public forum. In Hague v. Committee for Industrial 
Organization, the Court struck down an ordinance that prohibited 
all public meetings in the streets and other public places without a 
 
1 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). 
2 A number of years ago, a school administrator complained to me that my 
child’s columns for the school newspaper were “juvenile.” I could not resist 
remarking that as a sixteen-year-old that was to be expected since he was a juvenile. 
3 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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permit from the city.4 In a famous plurality opinion, Justice Owen 
Roberts found that there was a right to use government property for 
speech purposes. Roberts wrote: 
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time 
out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from 
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and 
liberties of citizens.5 
If any principle of the First Amendment is clearly established it is 
that viewpoint restrictions are not allowed in public forums unless the 
government meets strict scrutiny. Viewpoint restrictions of speech are 
virtually never allowed. The government obviously should not be able to 
advance a particular position by silencing those holding an opposite view. 
There can be no dispute that Frederick would not have been 
punished if his speech had condemned use of drugs. Thus, the sanctions 
for his speech were based entirely on the viewpoint he choose to express 
in a public forum. Chief Justice Roberts argued that it was an official 
school activity, but this fails to acknowledge that the speech occurred not 
in a classroom or even an auditorium, but on a public sidewalk. If 
Frederick had not been a student, but a person who used the occasion to 
hold up such a banner, surely the government could not have punished 
the individual, even though the government would have had an interest 
in keeping students from receiving messages that they perceived as 
encouraging illegal drug use. By contrast, the government could have 
stopped the person from coming into school with such a banner. The 
point is that even though it was during the school day, it was still a public 
sidewalk, and it was still the Court upholding viewpoint discrimination. 
Second, there was no evidence of any disruption of school activities. 
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the Court said 
that the First Amendment protected the ability of students in a high 
school to wear black armbands to protest the Vietnam War.6 The Court 
emphasized that the armbands were a silent protest that did not disrupt 
education within the schools.7 The Court said that “[t]here is no indication 
that the work of the schools or any class was disrupted.”8 Justice Fortas wrote that 
the speech was protected absent a showing that it would “materially 
 
4 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
5 Id. at 515 (Roberts, J., concurring). 
6 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
7 The Court also stressed that other symbols worn by students were allowed in 
the school and that it was impermissible for the government to discriminate among 
them based on their message. Id. at 508, 510. 
8 Id. at 508. 
LCB_12_1_ART2_CHEMERINSKY.DOC 3/23/2008 12:54:25 PM 
20 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:1 
and substantially interfere[] with the requirements of appropriate discipline 
in the operation of the school.”9 
Admittedly, subsequent Supreme Court cases failed to follow Tinker’s 
holding that student speech could be punished only if it was actually 
disruptive of school activities. In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the 
Court upheld the punishment of a student for a speech given at a school 
assembly, nominating another student for a position in student 
government, that was filled with sexual innuendo.10 The student was 
suspended for a few days and kept from speaking at his graduation as 
scheduled. 
The Court upheld the punishment and emphasized the need for 
judicial deference to educational institutions. Chief Justice Burger, writing 
for the Court, said that “[t]he determination of what manner of speech 
in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with 
the school board.”11 The Court also distinguished Tinker on the ground 
that it had involved political speech, whereas the expression in Bethel was 
sexual in nature. Chief Justice Burger said that “it is a highly appropriate 
function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and 
offensive terms in public discourse.”12 He concluded that “[a] high school 
assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit monologue” and “it 
was perfectly appropriate for the school to disassociate itself to make 
the point to the pupils that vulgar speech . . . is wholly inconsistent 
with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school education.”13 
In Bethel, the Court at least argued that Fraser’s speech disrupted 
school activities, but in Morse v. Frederick, the Court made no effort to do 
so. Although the Court did not overrule Tinker, it clearly abandoned the 
idea that speech can be punished only if it is actually disruptive of school 
activities. 
Third, the Court allowed punishment of speech that advocated 
illegal activity without any showing that it would have the slightest effect. 
The key case, defining when the government may punish advocacy of 
illegality is Brandenburg v. Ohio.14 A leader of a Ku Klux Klan group was 
convicted under the Ohio criminal syndicalism law. Evidence of his 
incitement was a film of the events at a Klan rally, which included racist 
and anti-Semitic speech, and several items that appeared in the film, 
including a number of firearms. In a per curium opinion, the Court 
said that: 
These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the 
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not 
 
9 Id. at 505 (citation omitted). 
10 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
11 Id. at 683. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 685–86. 
14 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or 
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting 
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action.15 
Chief Justice Roberts did not assert that Frederick’s banner would 
have the slightest effect in encouraging drug use. He could not do so. It 
is questionable whether students understood the banner as encouraging 
drug use, and even if they did it is doubtful any would be more likely to 
use drugs because of it. Justice Stevens expressed this well: 
This is a nonsense message, not advocacy. The Court’s feeble effort 
to divine its hidden meaning is strong evidence of that. . . . 
Admittedly, some high school students (including those who use 
drugs) are dumb. Most students, however, do not shed their brains 
at the schoolhouse gate, and most students know dumb advocacy 
when they see it. The notion that the message on this banner would 
actually persuade either the average student or even the dumbest 
one to change his or her behavior is most implausible.16 
My concern is thus that Morse v. Frederick is a significant departure 
from well established First Amendment principles, even those that 
concern when student speech can be punished. The only way of 
understanding the case is being about the need for deference to school 
authorities. Indeed, the majority concludes its opinion by expressing the 
need for deference to the principal. Chief Justice Roberts states: 
School principals have a difficult job, and a vitally important one. 
When Frederick suddenly and unexpectedly unfurled his banner, 
Morse had to decide to act—or not act—on the spot. It was 
reasonable for her to conclude that the banner promoted illegal 
drug use—in violation of established school policy—and that failing 
to act would send a powerful message to the students in her charge, 
including Frederick, about how serious the school was about the 
dangers of illegal drug use.17 
Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion, wants to see the case as 
being just about the interest of schools in stopping illegal drug use.18 But 
that begs the question of why expression about illegal drug use would be 
regarded as different from all other speech. Surely other activities—such 
as violence in schools—are worse. If a school can stop a student from 
holding up an ambiguous banner, like “Bong Hits 4 Jesus,” it would be 
able to punish a banner encouraging violence. There are countless 
examples of behavior that is illegal and harmful that might be expressed 
by students. Imagine a t-shirt or a banner encouraging promiscuous 
sexual activity illegal under statutory rape laws and potentially devastating 
 
15 Id. at 447. 
16 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2649 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
17 Id. at 2629. 
18 Id. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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to health. Or even what about a t-shirt or banner that encouraged 
students to skip school? The point is that if schools can punish “Bong 
Hits 4 Jesus,” it is hard to see why they could not sanction that speech as 
well. My fear is therefore that principals, school boards, and lower courts 
will read Morse v. Frederick as giving them more authority to punish 
student speech. 
Already there is indication that exactly this is occurring. For 
example, soon after Morse, in Wisniewski v. Board of Education of Weedsport 
Central School District, the Second Circuit upheld “an eighth-grade 
student’s suspension for sharing with friends via the Internet a small 
drawing crudely, but clearly, suggesting that a named teacher should be 
shot and killed.”19 The speech occurred entirely outside school. It was 
shared among friends via Instant Messaging. It was hyperbole, not a 
threat. As the Second Circuit noted: 
At the same time, a police investigator who interviewed Aaron 
concluded that the icon was meant as a joke, that Aaron fully 
understood the severity of what he had done, and that Aaron posed 
no real threat to VanderMolen or to any other school official. A 
pending criminal case was then closed. Aaron was also evaluated by 
a psychologist, who also found that Aaron had no violent intent, 
posed no actual threat, and made the icon as a joke.20 
Still, the Court of Appeals, citing to Morse, upheld the student’s 
punishment. This, of course, goes even further than Morse because it says 
that even speech that occurs entirely outside school can be punished. 
III. WHY MORSE V. FREDERICK WAS WRONG 
Why care whether school administrators can punish students for a 
silly banner like “Bong Hits 4 Jesus”? Justice Thomas, in his concurring 
opinion, argues that students should have no free speech rights at all and 
that Tinker should be expressly overruled.21 
In Tinker, the Court said that “First Amendment rights, applied in 
light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available 
to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or 
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”22 The Court said that “[i]n our 
system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. 
School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students . . . . 
[Students] are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect 
. . . .”23 
 
19 Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2007). 
20 Id. at 36. 
21 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
22 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
23 Id. at 511. 
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The problem with Justice Thomas’s argument that students should 
have no speech rights is that it undervalues the importance of student 
speech and overvalues the interests of the government in suppressing 
student speech. On the one hand, students, like all others in society, have 
an autonomy interest in expressing themselves. In general, freedom of 
speech is safeguarded as a fundamental right that is an essential aspect of 
personhood and autonomy. Professor Baker said: 
To engage voluntarily in a speech act is to engage in self-definition 
or expression. A Vietnam war protestor may explain that when she 
chants “Stop This War Now” at a demonstration, she does so 
without any expectation that her speech will affect the 
continuance of war . . . ; rather, she participates and chants in 
order to define herself publicly in opposition to the war. This war 
protestor provides a dramatic illustration of the importance of this 
self-expressive use of speech, independent of any effective 
communication to others, for self-fulfillment or self-realization.24 
Protecting speech because it aids the political process or furthers 
the search for truth emphasizes the instrumental values of expression. 
Protecting speech because it is a crucial aspect of autonomy sees 
expression as intrinsically important.25 Justice Thurgood Marshall 
observed that “[t]he First Amendment serves not only the needs of the 
polity but also those of the human spirit—a spirit that demands self-
expression.”26 
Students, too, have an autonomy interest in expressing themselves. 
The message may be political or entertainment or even just silly, but that 
is true of all speech that is protected in society. The Court in Morse v. 
Frederick stresses that Frederick’s banner was not political speech. Chief 
Justice Roberts states: “But not even Frederick argues that the banner 
conveys any sort of political or religious message. Contrary to the 
dissent’s suggestion, . . . this is plainly not a case about political debate 
over the criminalization of drug use or possession.”27 But the First 
Amendment has never been limited to protecting just political 
expression. 
Tinker powerfully expressed the importance of protecting student 
speech. After his famous declaration that students do not “shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate,” Justice Fortas states: “This has been the unmistakable 
holding of this Court for almost 50 years.”28 After a long string of 
 
24 C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 
964, 994 (1978). 
25 See, e.g., Martin Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 
(1982) (arguing that self-realization should be regarded as the exclusive value of the 
First Amendment). 
26 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
27 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2625 (2007). 
28 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
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citations to many prior Supreme Court rulings, Justice Fortas quotes 
Justice Robert Jackson’s eloquent opinion from West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette:29 
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects 
the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures—Boards of 
Education not excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate, 
and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not 
perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are 
educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous 
protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are 
not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to 
discount important principles of our government as mere 
platitudes.30 
Later in his majority opinion, Justice Fortas returns to this theme 
and powerfully proclaims the free speech rights of students. Fortas 
declares: 
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of 
totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority 
over their students. Students in school as well as out of school are 
“persons” under our Constitution. They are possessed of 
fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they 
themselves must respect their obligations to the State. In our 
system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of 
only that which the State chooses to communicate. They may not 
be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially 
approved. In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally 
valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to 
freedom of expression of their views.31 
Indeed, like Justice Jackson in Barnette, Justice Fortas stressed 
freedom of speech is especially important in schools. He quoted an 
earlier opinion from Justice Brennan declaring: “The vigilant protection 
of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community 
of American schools. The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of 
ideas.’”32 
At the same time, the Court underestimates the danger of 
government power in the schools context. The First Amendment is 
based on the reality that there is a strong impulse to silence and 
punish speech that is distasteful. As has often been expressed, the First 
Amendment is not needed for the messages we like; they would be 
allowed to occur anyway. Freedom of speech is about safeguarding the 
controversial or unpopular message. Chief Justice Roberts’s majority 
 
29 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that a 
state law requiring students to salute the flag is unconstitutional). 
30 Id. at 637. 
31 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. 
32 Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
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opinion in Morse v. Frederick never acknowledges the reality that 
principals may often choose to punish speech they don’t like, 
especially from students they don’t like. 
For students, there is no protection from arbitrary punishment for 
speech except through the First Amendment and the courts. Yet, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Morse v. Frederick risks that there will be 
much less judicial protection for student speech. 
The solution, then, is for lower courts—and hopefully principals 
and school boards—to read Morse v. Frederick narrowly. It was a 5-4 
decision and two of the Justices in the majority—Alito and Kennedy—
emphasized that the holding is just about the ability of schools to 
punish student speech encouraging drug use. The opinion should be 
read no more broadly than that. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The reality is that Morse v. Frederick is consistent with the decisions 
from the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts over the last two 
decades. Over the three decades of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, 
there have been virtually no decisions protecting rights of students in 
schools. Indeed, there have been remarkably few rulings concerning 
students’ speech, despite hundreds of lower court decisions on the 
topic. There have been only two Supreme Court cases concerning 
student speech in elementary, middle, and high schools, excluding 
cases concerning religious expression: Bethel School District No. 403 v. 
Fraser33 and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.34 In both, the Court 
rejected the students’ First Amendment claims and sided with the 
schools. 
In fact, in the almost forty years since Tinker, schools have won 
virtually every constitutional claim involving students’ rights. For 
instance, in Ingraham v. Wright,35 the Court rejected that students have 
a right to procedural due process before the imposition of corporal 
punishment. In New Jersey v. T.L.O.36 and Vernonia School District 47J v. 
Acton,37 the Court rejected Fourth Amendment claims by students and 
upheld the ability of schools to search students without probable cause 
and to subject them to random drug testing. In Board of Education v. 
Earls,38 the Court allowed a school system to require random drug 
testing of all students participating in extracurricular activities. 
In light of the later cases, it is hardly surprising that at least one 
federal court of appeals has concluded that subsequent Supreme 
 
33 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
34 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
35 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
36 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
37 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
38 536 U.S. 822 (2002). 
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Court cases cast doubt on whether Tinker remains viable and whether 
students retain free speech rights.39 There simply are hardly any 
Supreme Court cases in the past thirty years protecting students’ 
constitutional rights. 
Morse v. Frederick continues that pattern. But if lower courts focus 
on the concurring opinion of Justice Alito there is more hope. 
Reading his opinion as defining the scope of the holding leads to the 
conclusion that the case establishes only the power of schools to 
punish speech encouraging illegal drug use. It is not a victory for the 




39 Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 737 (7th Cir. 1994). 
